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DAVID ARMSTRONG, Political anatomy ofthe body. Medical knowledge in Britain in the
twentieth century, Cambridge University Press, 1983, 8vo, pp. xii, 146, £17.50.
This book belongs to the category describing itself as "thought provoking". For once this
claim is well grounded. Quite explicitly, the author sets out to apply the methods ofFoucault to
the analysis ofconceptual change within medicine in the present century. Although not a slavish
imitation ofFoucault, the hand and name ofthe master are never far from sight. But the book is
also sufficiently original and scholarly to be refreshing and challenging to both sociologists and
historians.
Dr Armstrong stands apart from the mainstream of both subjects. His approach will not be
universally applauded. Many of the objections to this book are the same as those which have
already been applied to Foucault's work. Some will view Armstrong's book as a challenging
work of synthesis; others will regard it as an unscientific fiction. However, from the soc[al
historian's point ofview there is much to admire. For instance, rather than restricting himselfto
a limited field the author deals with subjects as diverse as school clinics, paediatrics,
venereology, psychiatry, geriatrics, and general practice. He thus monitors change in twentieth-
century medicine less in terms of the high-technology specialisms than with respect to lower-
status specialisms which nevertheless occupy an important social function. An elaborate mosaic
is constructed demonstrating the significance of numerous key elements which have hitherto
been omitted from the picture painted by both sociologists and historians, or which, as in the
case of the Peckham Health Centre, have only just received the attention they deserve. Figures
such as Balint, Pickles, and especially Ryle (accidentally not included in the index), or
initiatives such as the Goodenough Report on Medical Education, the Oxford Institute of
Social Medicine, or the Social Survey, all find their places in Armstrong's explanatory
framework.
True to his neo-structuralist affiliations, Armstrong enriches our vocabulary by adding to the
by now familiar concept "panopticon", his own invention "Dispensary". Dispensary is nowhere
defined precisely, but it is loosely characterized on a great number of occasions in the book as
the "new way", "new gaze", "new extended clinical gaze" of modern medicine, involving the
"extension of the panoptic vision to a whole society". He is able to sustain this view with respect
to a wide variety of instances taken from the medical specialisms under review, and by this
means to demonstrate that modern medicine has extended its domain from human anatomy to
control ofthe entire "social space" or the "interstices" between individuals.
Armstrong thus postulates a major epistemological shift in modern medicine, along with
technological medicine, serving to extend the process of medicalization or "surveillance". He
diligently avoidsjudgement on the changes described. It is left open to us to regard Armstrong's
account as a celebration of the final maturation of the new scientific attitude within medicine.
On the other hand, his language and rhetoric invite the reader to recognize the dangers of the
intrusive gaze of the Dispensary. As an arm of this movement the social sciences themselves
contribute to the possible menace of medicalization. Dispensary might thus be regarded as the
evolutionary form ofmedicine ordained for 1984.
As in the case of Foucault, the historian's difficulties with Armstrong relate to the lack of a
precise historical frame of reference. Anyone familiar with the diversity of seventeenth-century
medical theory and the dominance of Baconian natural history will fail to appreciate the case
for regarding Dispensary as an invention of any later age. No doubt structuralists can take pre-
cursors in their stride. But it is difficult to tie Dr Armstrong down to locating his
epistemological change at any precise point in time, with the result that he is able to escape
explaining this change with reference to any discrete set of historical circumstances. Past
changes of perspective within medicine thus seem to occur spontaneously without any
relationship to socio-economic circumstances. Major events like the two world wars, or the
National Health Service legislation (1946, not 1964, p. 82) are mentioned in passing as
reference points, but they assume no greater significance. In cases where he is more specific it is
doubtful whether his analysis is correct. For instance, it seems to imply a slightly rose-tinted
view ofgeneral practice to regard World War II as the occasion for the creation ofthe "recons-
tructed doctor-patient relationship and the fabrication of the patient as a subject" (p. 103),
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involving the rise of the health centre and the health care team. In terms of precursors, these
ideas went back at least to 1920; in terms of operational application, the modernization of
general practice cannot really be said to have begun before 1966. It may even be argued that the
characterization of modern general practice - "a network of surveillance that discovered,
identified and monitored the common disease, the minor symptom, the transient illness which
hardly marked the body ofthe patient" (p. 84) - is little more than a gleam in the eye ofa few
luminaries in the Royal College ofGeneral Practitioners, rather than an epistemological reality
representative of the body ofgeneral practice. As far as this aspect of medicine at least is con-
cerned, the Dispensary might lie in the future, but it is not standard for 1948, noreven for 1984.
Charles Webster
Wellcome Unit for theHistory ofMedicine, Oxford
KENNETH DEWHURST, HughlingsJackson onpsychiatry, Oxford, Sandford Publications,
1982, 8vo, pp. xi, 169, £9.00.
Formidable obstacles confront anyone trying to come to grips with the thought of John
Hughlings Jackson. Despite the urging ofhis friends and colleagues, Jackson nevercollected his
contributions into a single magnum opus; as a result, his writings remain scattered in numerous
articles, some ofwhich are to be found in rare and obscurejournals. Only partial collections of
these papers exist. To add to the problem, Jackson's prose is dense and, at times, opaque. These
facts go far to explain why, for all his importance to clinical and theoretical neurology, Jackson
remains elusive to thehistorian.
We are therefore indebted to Dr Dewhurst for having undertaken the onerous task ofsifting
Jackson's diffuse and turgid works to produce a concise and lucid summary ofhis ideas on psy-
chiatry. Jackson emerges as a complex and subtle thinker - as, in J. J. Putnam's words, "one of
the great philosophers ofmedicine". For the scattered character ofJackson's output masks the
inner coherence ofhis analysis ofapparently disparate topics and a formidable determination to
achieve a unified understanding ofall diseases ofthe nervous system.
Psychiatric disorders were seen as merely one form of nervous disease. Jackson was perhaps
the most single-minded and uncompromising of psychiatric physicalists: "if there be such a
thing as a disease of the mind", he held, "we can do nothing for it." He was unwilling even to
consider the existence of such an entity as a "psychological malady", regarding hysteria, for
example, as a form of malingering. Jackson approached psychoses with an essentially
neurological perspective. Taking post-ictal states as his model of all insanities, he sought to
understand them as sensori-motor disturbances ofthe higher nervous centres, with concomitant
intellectual symptoms. Rather than regarding insanities as sui generis, Jackson sought to
integrate them into a comprehensive theory ofthepathology ofthe nervous system.
Hejustified this attempt at a holistic concept ofthe function and dysfunction ofthe nervous
system by reference to the putative continuity that obtained between the lower and the highest
nervous centres. The anterior lobes ofthe cerebral cortex were, like thebasal ganglia and spinal
cord, sensori-motor organs; they were also centres for the intellect, but Jackson maintained
that, from a medical point ofview, this was ofsecondary interest. Dewhurst rightly points to the
importance ofJackson's one-time teacher, Thomas Laycock, in shaping this unitary concept of
nervous structure and function as a hierarchical arrangement of progressively more complex
but basically homologous levels oforganization. Laycock also anticipated Jackson's concept of
disease as the consequence ofthedegeneration ofthe mostdeveloped units ofthis hierarchy.
Jackson's thought strikes us as more "modern" than Laycock's because the former worked
within the framework of post-Darwinian ideas of evolution; however, Dewhurst, like Young
before him, recognizes that it was not Darwin's, but Herbert Spencer's version ofevolutionary
theory that had thegreatest impact on Jackson's thinking. Nervous diseases (including insanity)
were for Jackson reversals of the evolutionary process, whereby higher functional levels were
impaired or destroyed with resultant hyperactivity of the nervous structures that remained
intact. The symptomatology ofthe neuroses was thus explicable as a compound of the "nega-
tive" effects flowing from the degradation of higher centres and the "positive" effects of the
uninhibited operation oflevels oforganization that were, in evolutionary terms, more primitive.
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